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This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the 
secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the 
properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure 
is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis 
phase of most existing compilers. Appropriate semantics are presented 
and proved correct. An important application is the confinement problem: 
the mechanism can prove that a program cannot cause supposedly non-
confidential results to depend on confidential input data. 
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1 Introduction 
Computer system security relies in part on Information flow control, 
that is, on methods of regulating the dissemination of information among 
objects throughout the system. An information flow policy specifies a set 
of security classes for information, a flow relation defining permissible 
flows among these classes, and a method of binding each storage object 
to some class. An operation, or series of operations, that uses the value 
of some object, say x, to derive a value for another, say y, causes a flow 
from x to y. This flow is admissible in the given flow policy only if 
the security class of x flows into the security class of y. 
Prior work on the enforcement of flow policies has concentrated on 
run time mechanisms. One type of mechanism enforces a given flow policy 
by controlling processes' read and write access rights to objects: no 
process may acquire read access for an input object, or write access for 
an output object, unless the security class of every input flows into the 
security class of every output -- even if some outputs depend on only a 
subset of the inputs. ADEPT-50 [30] , the Case system [29], the MITRE 
system [3» 23], and the Privacy Restriction Processor [26] are of this type. 
These mechanisms are generally easy to implement because they make no 
attempt to examine the structure of a program. A second type of (more 
complex) mechanism accounts for program structures in order to determine 
flows between specific input and output objects. Fenton's data mark 
machine [10], the mechanism of Gat and Saal [13]» and the surveillance 
mechanism of Jones and Lipton [19] are of this type. The surveillance 
mechanism employs a program transformation to insure that all flows are 
properly accounted for at run time. A detailed discussion of all these 
mechanisms can be found in [ 7 ] . 
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This paper presents a compile time mechanism that certifies 
a program only if it specifies no flows in violation of the flow policy. 
Besides the aesthetic attraction of establishing a program's security 
before it executes, a certification mechanism has important advantages. 
It can be specified directly in terms of language structures, which facili-
tates its comprehension and its proof of correctness. It greatly reduces 
the need for run time checking. It does not impair a program's execution 
speed. (See also [23]) . 
Prior certification does not completely eliminate the need for 
run time checking. Run time support is needed to raise the tolerance against 
hardware malfunctions and other threats to the integrity of certified 
programs. It is needed to verify that computed addresses remain in the 
ranges assumed for them during certification. It is needed to control 
covert channels, which allow flows outside the storage objects of the system. 
2 Lattice Model of Information Flow 
We give a brief review of the flow model on which the certification 
mechanism is based [6, 7]• The model generalizes earlier work as reported 
in [3, 9, 10, 11, 23, 26, 29, 30]. 
2.1 Policy Description and,Properties 
A flow policy can be represented by (s, , where S is a given set of 
security classes and is a flow relation specifying permissible flows 
between pairs of classes. Each storage object x -- e.g., constant, scalar 
variable^ array» or file -- is assigned (bound) to a security class, 
denoted by underbar, x. The notation x thus means that a flow from 
object x to object y is permissible in the flow policy. We will suppose 
that the binding of each object t;o a security class is static, and can 
be determined from the declarations contained in a program. 
Under the reasonable assumptions that there is a finite number of 
security classes, that the flow relation is reflexive (i.e., x + ^ i s 
always permissible), and that the flow relation is transitive (i.e., 
x̂  •*• £ £ inpl ies jk •*• z), we may suppose that {s, +) is a lattice. 
This means that, corresponding to any pair of classes, there are unique 
upper and lower bound classes. If (S, •+) is not a lattice, It may be 
transformed into one by adding new classes as necessary without changing 
the flows among the original classes [8]. The lattice properties are 
exploited to construct an efficient certification mechanism. 
The symbols ® and 8 denote, respectively, the associative and 
commutative least upper bound and greatest lower bound operators of the 
lattice (s, •+) [kt 28J. The least upper bound is defined so that x. •+ ^ 
for I • l,...,m is equivalent to the relation x, ® ... ® x •*• y. It can 
—I —m -L-
be envisaged as requiring that flows from various operand classes must 
pass through a single, common class en route to a given result class. 
The greatest lower bound is defined so that x_-»• for J H 1 n is 
equivalent to the relation x -*• ^ 8 ... 8 It can be envisaged as 
requiring that flows from a given operand class must pass through a singl 
common class en route to various result classes. There is a h i ghest 
if 
class H, which is the least upper bound of all classes, and a least class 
L, which is the greatest lower bound of all classes. 
All unnamed programming language constants are members of L. This 
assumption is reasonable since the flow of an ordinary constant, say "99", 
into a variable, say x, puts in x no information about any other object. 
Only when "99" is known to be the value of an object y for which ^ A- x 
must its flow be prevented; but this is done by restricting the flow 
from y, not from "99". 
Figures I and 2 illustrate lattices that arise frequently in practice. 
Figure 1 is a linear "priority lattice" on n classes 0,l,..,,n-l, where 
L s0 and H=n-1. This lattice applies to the simple confinement problem with 
classes nonconfidential (0) and confidential (l) [10] and to the corwnon 
military security problem with classes unclassified (0), confidential (1), 
secret (2), and top secret (3) [30]. Figure 2 shows a more complex 
"property lattice" representing the immediate inclusions among all 2 n 
subsets of n=3 properties represented as bit vectors. It generalizes 
easily to any value of n. It is used in systems where information may flow 
only to a security class having at least the same properties as the 
originating class [3, 23, 29, 30]. 
2.2 Flow 
Information flows from object x to object y, denoted x -> y, whenever 
information stored in x is transferred to, or used to derive information 
transferred to, object y. A program statement specifies a flow x => y if 
execution of the statement could result in a flow x => y. 
n 
S ={0,1,...,n-l} | 
n-1 
I -»• j i f f r <_ j { 
t 
i • j = max (i,J) 
i 8 j = min (i,j) 
L - 0, H - n - 1 0 
Description Precedence graph 
F i gure 1. Linear priority lattice 
S = {000,001,..., 111} 
A •+ B i ff 0R(A,B) = B 
A • B - 0R(A,B) 
A 8 B = AND(A,B) 
L - 000, H = 111 
Descr i pt ion 
110 101 Oil 
t X X t 
100 010 001 
000 
Precedence graph 
Figure 2 . Property lattice for n™3. 
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F1ows a re explicit or i mp1i c i t. An exp1\c i t f1ow x => y occurs 
whenever the operations generating it are independent of the value of x. 
Assignment statements, I/O statements, and value-returning procedure calls 
generate explicit flows. An implici t flow x »> y occurs whenever a 
statement specifies a flow from some arbitrary z to y, but execution 
depends on the value of x. Consider for example the statements 
y: = 1; j_f x=0 then y: =0, 
where x is either 0 or 1. On termination of these statements, x=y 
whether or not the then clause was executed. Hence the j_f statement 
causes an implicit flow x a > y. In general, all conditional structures 
generate implicit flows. 
It should be noted that the relation => is transitive, that is, 
x => y => z implies x => z. If x => y because some function having x 
as an operand stores its result in y, the flow Is di rect; otherwise it 
is ind i rect. An assignment "y f (...,x,...)" thus causes flow x => y 
directly, while the pair "z := f(...,x,...); y g(...,z,...)" causes 
flow x => y indirectly. 
2.3 Security Requirements 
A program p is secure if and only if no execution of p results in 
a flow x => y unless x . ^ necessary and sufficient condition for the 
securlty of p is then 
(1) "x => y for some execution of p only If x •»• 
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Unfortunately, condition (1) Is generally undecldable. Any procedure 
purported to decide It could be applied to the statement 
If f(x) halts then y := 0, 
and thus provide a solution to the halting problem for an arbitrary recursive 
function [2k]. (in a related study, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman have shown 
that, without severe restrictions, protection systems contain Intractable, 
if not undecidable, accessing Questions [16]). 
The undecldabi1Ity Is removed If we replace (?) with the security 
condi tIon 
(2) "x => y Is specified by p only If x + 
The previous J_f statement can clearly be tested for this condition. 
However, security condition (2) gives less precision In program certification 
than (1). For example, consider the program 
I f x-0 then i f xj<0 then y z 
and a flow relation that disallows only z => y. This program Is secure by 
(1) since no execution of it can result in z •»> y; but it will not be certified 
by a mechanism based on (2) since it specifies z => y. There Is no reason 
to believe that loss of precision is avoidable; Jones and Lipton, for example, 
have shown that it Is not even possible to construct a mechanism that rejects 
exactly the Insecure executions of a program £193 -
The certification mechanism to be presented is based on condition (2). 
It determines whether a given program specifies Invalid flows. 
Irrespective of whether the program can ever execute them. 
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3 The Certification Mechanism 
When the security classes of variables are declared in a program and 
are static, it is easy to incorporate the certification process into the 
analysis phase of a compiler. The mechanism wi11 be presented in the form 
of certification semantics — actions for the compiler to perform, along 
with usual semantic actions such as type checking and code generation, when 
a string of a given syntactic type Is recognized. This procedure differs 
from an information tracing procedure given by Moore 125]: ours verifies 
program flows against a standard, whereas Moore's seeks primarily to 
construct a flow graph. 
When external objects, such as files and separately compiled procedures, 
are bound to a program, the linker must verify that the actual security 
class of each such object corresponds properly to the security class declared 
formally for it in the program. This must be done before a program is executed. 
The certification mechanism exploits lattice properties for efficiency. 
The transitive flow relation Implies that sequences of secure direct flows 
are secure and, hence, the semantics need only certify the direct flows 
implied by each syntactic type. The least upper and greatest lower bound 
properties greatly simplify the amount of information needed to track the 
origins and destinations of flows. Suppose x^ x m are sources of infor-
mation for some receiving object y, as in an assignment statement "y 
f{xj,...,xm)" or in an output statement "output x^ x m is y". Rather 
than certify ^ separately for each i, the compiler may form A = 
2S.J ® • ® a s t h e source objects are recognized, and verify simply A -»• — 
y 
only a single internal variable representing the maximal class of the 
source objects is needed. Now, suppose y,,...,y are to receive information 
i n 
derived from some source object x, as in an input statement "input yj,...,y 
from x", or in a structure generating implicit flows from an object x in a 
conditional expression to objects yj in that structure's scope. Rather 
than certify x •*• ^ separately for each j, the compiler may form B = 
9 ... 8 ^ as .the receiving objects are being recognized, and verify simply 
x -»• B -- only a single internal variable representing the minimal 
class of the receiving objects is needed. 
The presentation of the full mechanism has been divided into four 
parts: a) assignment, I/O, and simple control structures; b) general control 
structures and complex data structures; c) procedure calls; and finally 
d) exception handling. 
3.1 Assignment, 1/0, and Simple Control Structures 
We consider a programming language that supports only the elementary 
data types integer, Boolean, and fi1e. Extensions to other types are 
straightforward. Arithmetic and Boolean expressions are formed from variables 
and constants as in Pascal [31]. The control structures specify assignment, 
Input and output with files, selection (by an \f_ statement), and iteration 
(by a while statement). A program comprises a list of declarations, including 
security class declarations, followed by the executable statements. An 
example program is given in Figure 3(a). 
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Table I gives the syntax and certification semantics for this language. 
To avoid ambiguities in the semantics, multiple occurrences of the same 
syntactic type are distinguished (e.g., <x>, <x>^, and < x > 2 ) •
 T h e security 
class of a syntactic type <x> is denoted by <x>. A compiler variable, 
CERTIFIED, Is initialized to true and set to false if the compiler ever 
detects a flow specification violating the flow relation. A program is 
certified as secure if and only if CERTIFIED = true after the entire program 
has been analyzed. The reader ;s referred to Gries [15, Sect. 12.2] for 
an exposition of additional semantic actions, e.g., code generation, that 
must be defined to complete the compiler. 
Figure A illustrates the certification of a simple assignment 
"c := a*2+b". The overall parse can be represented as a syntax tree for the 
statement. The security classes (in parentheses) are shown opposite each 
subtree. The semantic actions in effect propagate the security classes of 
expressions up the tree and verify the flow when the assignment operator 
is accounted for at the top. 
Figure 3(b) shows the certification actions for the example program. 
When the selection and iteration statements are recognized (lines 20 and 
22), the implicit flows from the controlling expressions (the • of the 
operand classes) to the variables receiving flows in their scopes (the 8 
of all such variable classes) are checked. The example program is certified. 
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1 begin 
2 i,n: integer security class L; 
3 flag: Boolean security class L; 
k f1,f2: file security class L; 
5 x,sum: Integer security class H; 
6 f3,fk: file security class H; 
7 begin 
8 I {L L) 
9 n 0; 0 + n ( L + L ) 
sum 0; 0 -»- Turn (L -> H) 
M while I < 100 do ~ 
12 begin 
13 Input flag from f I; f]_ flag (L -»• L) 
U output flag to f2; flag f2 (L •+• L) 
15 Input x from f3; f3 •+ x "Th H) 
16 H flag then ~ 
17 begin 
1 8 n n + 1; n • j_ ji (L <+ L) 
19 sum := sum + x sum 9 x sum (H H) 
2 0 end; flag -»• n 9 sum (l -»• L) 
21 i i + 1 ! • I * " ! TIT- L) 
2 2 end; 1 9 100 + flag 9 f2 8 x 8 
n̂  9 sum 8 J_ (L •*• L) 
23 output n, sum, sum/n Jto n 9 sum 9 sum 9 n -*• f<» (H •+• H) 
2k end — — 
25 end 
a) Program b) Certification Checks 
Figure 3. A Program and its Certification. 
Syntax Rule 
Declarations 
1 <type> : i n t e g e r [ Boolean | file 
2 <Idl1st> <ident> | <IdIist> , <ident> 
3 <decl> <id1ist> : <type> securi ty class 
A <decllst> <decl> ] <declist> ; <decl> 
Expressions 
5 <addop> ::= + | - | v 
6 <mulop> : * | / | a 
7 <relop> : : = < | l l = | » t ) l ] > 
8 <var> ::= <ident> 
9 <file> ::= <ident> 
10 <factor> <var> 
11 <factor> : < c o n s > 
12 <factor> : ( <exp> ) 
13 <factor> - <factor>j 
14 <term> ::»<factor> 
15 <term> : <term>j <mulop> <factor> 
16 <aexp> <term> 
17 <aexp> ::= <aexp>j <addop> <term> 
18 <exp> <aexp> 
19 <exp> ::» <aexp>. <relop> <aexp>^ 
Table i. Basic Certification Semantics. 
Certification Semantics 
<security class> for each <ident> In <idlist> associate 
<security class> with <ident> in the symbo 
table entry for <ident> 
<var> := < i den t> 
<fi1e> := <ident> 
<factor> := <var> 
<factor> L (the least class) 
<factor> :«= <exp> 
<factor> := <factor>j 
<term> := <factor> 
<term> <term>| A <factor> 
<aexp> :° <term> 
<aexp> := <aexp>| • <term> 
<exp> := <aexp> 
<exp> := <aexp>. C <aexp>„ 
Syntax Rule 
Assignment 
20 <stmt> <var> <exp> 
Input 
21 <Inllst> ::» <var> 
22 <In Ii st> : < I n 1 i st>| , <var> 
23 <stmt> : i n p u t <inl i st> from <file> 
Output 
2U <outllst> <exp> 
25 <outli st> ::=> <outlist>j , <exp> 
26 <stmt> : o u t p u t <outlist> to <flle> 
Compound 
27 <stlist> : < s t m t > 
28 <stlist> <stllst>1 ; <stmt> 
29 <stmt> begin <stlist> end 
Selection 
30 <stmt> j_f <exp> then <stmt>j [else <stmt>2] 
Iteratlon 
31 <stmt> ::•» whl le <exp> do <stmt>j 
Program 
32 <prog> begin <declist> ; <stmt> end 
Table I, cont. 
Certification Semantics 
<stmt> :- <var> 
if not (<exp> -»• <var>) then CERTIFIED fa ise 
<inlist> 
<inlist> 
<stmt> := <in 11st> 
if not (<file> <lnlist>) then CERTIFIED false 
<var> 
<inlist>, 8 <var> 
<outli st> := <exp> 
<outl i st> : =• <out 1 ist>^ $ <exp> 
<stmt> :- <file> 
if not (<outl ist> <f i le>) then CERTIFIED false 
<stl ist> :• <stmt> 
<stlist> <stllst>t 8 <stmt> 
<stmt> := <st]i st> 
<stmt> := <stmt>. [8 <stmt>2] 
if not (<exp> <stmt>) then CERTIFIED false 
<stmt> <stmt>1 
if not (<exp> -*• <stmt> then CERTIFIED false 
if CERTIFIED then certify <prog> else report security 
violation. (CERTIFIED is initialized to true and set to 
false if a violation is detected) 
1<I 
a • b •*• c 7 
<aexp> (a) <addop> 7 ^ r m > (b) 
<term> (a) 
< te rm> (a) <mulop> <factor> (L) 
I " I I 
<factor> (a) * <cons> (L) 
I I 









• F ? 9 u r e V Certification Tree of an Assignment Statement. 
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The correctness of the certification semantics is straightforwardly 
established. Let Xj x^ denote the operands (source objects) in an 
<exp> or an <outlist>, and y 1 y^ the results (receiving objects) in 
an <inlist> or <stmt>. From Table I, it is easy to deduce that 
(pi) <exp> - <outllst> " X . 9 ... 9 x 
• 1 ———— —I —m 
(p2) <lnl lst> = <stmt> = ^ 9 ... 9 ^ 
We wish to prove: 
Theorem. A program is certified only if it is secure. 
The proof is an induction on the structure Index i of a given program p; i 
is simply the number of <stmt> nodes in a syntax tree for p. As a basis, 
consider i«l. There are three cases for the single simple <stmt> constituting 
1) Suppose <stmt> = "<var> :• <exp>". Let x. x denote the operands l m 
of <exp>; by (pi), <exp> » x^ 9 ... 6 The program Is certified only 
if <exp> -»• <var> (Rule 20), and thus only when it is secure. 2) Suppose 
<stmt> «= "input <inlist> from <flle> n. Let y^ y n denote the variables 
in <in1ist>; by (p2), <inlist> = ^ 9 ... program Is certified 
only if <f i ie> -»• <inl ist> (Rule 23), and thus only when it is secure. 
3) Suppose <stmt> - "output <oytlist> to <file>". Let xj,...,xm be all 
the objects in <outlist>; by (pi), <out1 lst> a Xj • ••• ® x ^ The program 
Is certified only If <outlist> <f I le> (Rule 26), and thus only when It 
is secure. Thus the theorem holds for all programs of one simple statement. 
As an induction hypothesis, assume that the theorem holds whenever the 
program's structure Index satisfies 1 £ i < J, and consider a program 
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p for which i » J. There are two cases. I) p Is d compound statement of the 
form <stmt> » "begin <stlist> end." The semantics assume that <stmt> Is 
certified whenever <stlist> Is (Rule 29). Since <stllst> denotes a sequence 
of statements each with index not exceeding J-l, and since the transitivity 
of the flow relation implies that any sequence of secure flows is secure, 
<stmt> Is secure when <stlist> is. 2) p Is a selection or iteration 
statement of the form <stmt> = "jrf <exp> then <stmt>j [else <stmt> 2]" or 
"while <exp> do <stmt>j". Let x.,..., x be the operands of <exp>; by (pi), 
<exp> x. ®...® x . Let y,,...,y be the objects receiving flows specified 
• J —m i n 
by <stmt>j [and <stmt>2]; by (p2) and Rule 30, <stmt> = <s_tmt> | [8 <stmt>^j -
0 ... By induction <stmt>^ [and <stmt> 2], having structure indices 
not exceeding J-l, are certified only if secure. However, Rules 30 and 31 
certi fy <stmt> only ifx^ ® ... • ^ 8 ... a n d t f i u s 0 0 ^ w* 1 e n 
the selection or iteration statement is secure. This completes the correct-
ness proof of the certification semantics. 
3.2 General Control and Data Structures 
The method of certifying the jj_f and whi le statements can be extended 
to any selection or Iteration structure expressible as a single statement. 
This Includes, for example, the Pascal repeat, for, and case statements 13?3. 
The prl nciple is to identify the operands xj,...,xm of the controlling expres-
sion and the objects yj y n receiving flows within the scope of the struc-
ture, and then verl fy that ® ... 8 • • • 
This technique can be extended to control structures arising from 
arbitrary goto statements. However, certifying a program with unrestricted 
1/ 
gal£s requires a control flow analysis of the program to determine the objects 
receiving flows within the scope of a conditional expression. (This analysis 
Is unnecessary If gotos are restricted — e.g., to loop exits - - s o that 
the scope of conditional expressions can be determined during syntax analysts). 
Following is an outline of the analysis required to do the certification. 
All basic blocks (single-entry, single-exit substructures) are Identified. 
A control flow graph is constructed, showing transitions among basic blocks; 
associated w|th block bj is an expression ej that selects the successor of b. 
In the graph. (How to do this is detailed In [I, 22]). The security class 
of block bj Is the greatest lower bound of the security classes of all objects 
receiving flows In bj (If there are no such objects, this class Is H). The 
Immediate forward dominator IFD(b.) Is computed for each block b^; It is the 
closest block to b. among the set of blocks which lie on all paths from b. 
to the program exit. Define Bj as the set of all blocks on some path from 
b. to IFD(b.). The security class Bj is the greatest lower bound of the 
classes of blocks in B { . Since the only blocks directly conditioned on the 
selector expression e. of b. are those In B^, the program is secure If each 
block b. Is Independently secure and B_j for all i. Full details of this 
procedure, with examples, are given In [6]. 
The mechanism can also be extended to handle complex data structures. 
We shall consider arrays and records to Illustrate the method; Table M shows 
the semantics. We assume .that, Just as they are of the same data type, the 
elements of an array are of the same security class. The certification 
semantics specify that, as an array reference Is processed, the classes of . 
the subscripts should be Joined with that of the array, yielding a class 
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<array ref> « <ident> • <subllst> (Rule 35). This Is sufficient as long as 
the array reference is a source object In an expression. If, however, the 
array reference is a receiving object, e.g., on the left side of an assignment 
statement, the relation <subl lst> <Ident> must also be verified. This is 
because information about the subscripts flows Into the array iri this case — 
e.g., after the assignment "a[i] 1" is made on an all-zero array, the 
value of i can be deduced by searching for the first non-zero element. 
Since <array ref> • <ident> 9 <subllst> is computed for any array reference 
(Rule 35)» and since then <sublist> <ldent> implies <sublist> ® <Ident> -
<ident>, this check reduces to testing whether <array ref> «» <ident> when 
<array ref> is recognized as receiving a flow. We have not shown this check 
in the certification tables. 
As a general rule, certification semantics must generate code that 
verifies whether computed addresses refer to the objects assumed during 
certification. Thus the array semantics must verify that the subscripts 
select elements in the declared range of the array (Rule 35). Without this, 
a statement like Ma[i] :»b" might cause an Invalid flow b •> c, where c is 
an object addressed by a[i] when I Is out of range. 
A record r Is a structure comprising fields x,,...,x , the I'th element 
i m 
being referenced by the compound name r.x.. Having a distinct name, each 
element can be assigned to a different security class. The notation ®r_ denotes 
r.Xj ® — • r , x m ' is similarly defined. An operation copying a record 
from a file f into r is secure only If f_ An operation copying a 
record r into a file f Is secure only I f •*• f_. An assignment "r :- s" 
for two records of Identical structure Is secure only If s.x^ r.Xj for 
each I. (A stronger, but not equivalent, requirement is_ •*• Bjr would be 
easier to implement). 
Syntax Rule 
Arrays 
33 <sublist> : < e x p > 
3b <subllst> <sublist>j , <exp> 
35 <array ref> : < i d e n t > [ <subllst> ] 
Records 
36 <stmt> input <rec> from <flle> 
37 <stmt> ::» output <rec> to <flle> 
38 <stmt> ::= <rec>. := <rec>„ 
Table II. Certification of Arrays and Records 
Certification Semantics 
<sublist> := <exp> 
<subl?st> <subl Ist>^ ® <exp> 
<array ref> <Ident> 9 <sub1ist> 
generate subscript range checking code 
<stmt> : = 8 <rec> 
If not (<fi 1e> <stmt>) then CERTIFIED :- false 
<stmt> := <file> 
if not (C<rec> <stmt>) then CERTIFIED false 
if <rec>j and <rec>^ have corresponding elements X i « « * i fX 
1 n 
then 
if not (<rec>j .x. -*• <rec>^ .x. for all i) 
then CERTIFIED := false 
<stmt> 8<re_c> | 
else TYPE ERROR true 
3.3 Procedure Calls 
A program p Is secure only If It cal1s certifled procedures for which 
the linkage flows are secure. Let q be a procedure with formal input 
parameters x^ x^ and formal output parameters yj,...,y . Consider 
a call to q in p of the form 
cal1 q ( a ) , . . . b j , . . . , b ), 
where are taken as th-i actual input parameters and bj tr 
as the actual output parameters of the call. The security of the call 
requires three conditions be verified: 
a) q is secure, 
* —] f o r ' = ' ' • • • > m > a n d 
c ) ij kj for j =• 1,.. .,n. 
Should the cal1 statement appear in the scope of conditional expressions 
the Implicit flows from to objects that could receive 
values during execution of q, must be verified. To this end, the compiler 
of q must Identify all objects Cj,...,^ to wliich q specifies flows; among 
them will be the formal output parameters of q. The security of the calI 
statement requires that 
d) e, • ... • e. -»- c, 8 ... 0 c„. 
—I —k —I HI 
If (d) is verified, then by (c) e ̂  « ... 6 e^ -+• ^ bj for each actual 
output bj of q. 
Unless p and q are compiled together, conditions (a)-(d) cannot be 
verified at the same time. However, the certifier can output Into the 
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separately compiled p and q information used subsequently by a linker to 
certify the linkage flows. On recognizing a call to q in p, the certifier outputs 
the list of rrrt-n+1 classes (a, a : b.,.. . ,b ; e. ® ... ® e. ) . For 
—i —— l —n —I —k 
procedure q, it outputs the list of m+n+1 security classes (x,,...,x ; 
—I —m 
^j,...,^; £j 9 ... 9 . By matching these lists, the linker can verify 
condi t ions (b)- (d) . 
This mechanism permits constructing a procedure q which outputs results 
of a higher class than the inputs. This is convenient when q itself., or 
confidential information used by q to compute its results, must be protected. 
The flow of information computed by q can be restricted to actual outputs 
of high security classes. 
The foregoing approach poses a serious limitation in designing a procedure 
q for handling arbitrary classes of information, as is typical of library 
procedures. The formal inputs xj,...,xm must be declared in the highest 
secur i ty class H so that _x. (i = 1,... ,m) can be ver i f i ed for all ca 11 s . 
This implies that y,,-..,y must also be declared in H, since they will be 
I n 
derived from xj,...,x m. This in turn implies that no call on q can be 
verified unless the caller has assigned b,,...,b to H, even if a.,...fa 
I n I m 
are all in the least class L. The foregoing mechanism cannot therefore 
be used to construct unrestricted procedures that yield low security 
results from data in arbitrary security classes. 
One solution, analogous to the PL/I GENERIC procedure for different 
data types [17], is to prepare a separate version of q for each possible 
combination of input security classes. The viability of this approach is 
questionable when there are many possible combinations of parameter security 
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classes. A more attractive solution results when q is restricted in two 
ways: its output parameters are derived solely from the input parameters 
and information in the least class L; it is not permitted to write into 
any other nonlocal objects. (Local objects can be written if their values 
are erased when q returns.) The security of a call on such a restricted 
procedure is verified whenever 
a) a. © ... 9 a •+ b, 8 8 b , and 
—1 —m — I -n 
b) e. 9 . . . 9 e. + b, 6 ... fl b . 
—1 —k —1 —n 
Table III gives the semantics for certifying these conditions. Note that 
condition (b) is verified by assigning the class b, B ... 9 b to the node 
—I —n 
of the syntax tree associated with the cal1 statement, so that the implicit 
flow is handled the same as in other statements. 
A special case of these restricted procedures is the "function" type 
procedure (e.g., SORT, LOG, SIN). Here a procedure f is called during 
expression evaluation (e.g., by f ( a j , . . . ) and returns with a single 
result derived entirely from the input parameters and constants. Since 
there are no explicit output parameters, the function call can be treated 
as any other expression with operands a.,...,a . Table 111 shows the syntax 
I m 
and semantics for this case. 
Syntax Rule 
39 <Inparams> ::= <exp> 
<inparams> ::= <rnparams>^, <exp> 
Al <outparams> :: = <var> 
<outparams> <outparams>^, <var> 
*»3 <stmt> :: = 
cal1 <ident> (<inparams> ; <outparams>) 
M cfnca!l> ::= <ident> (<inparams>) 
<factor> ::= <fncall> 
Table III. Certification of Restricted Procedure 
Cert i f i cat ion Semant i cs 
<inparams> := <exp> 
<inparams> := <inparams>^ ® <exp> 
<outparams> :~ <var> 
<outparams> := <outparams>^ 0 <var> 
if not <i npararcis> -+• <outparams> then 
CERTIFIED false 
<stmt> := <outpar?ms> 
<fnca11> := <i nparams> 
<factor> := <fncal1> 
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3.** Exception Handling 
Program traps caused by exceptional conditions -- underflow, overflow, 
divide-by-zero, array subscript range, endfile, and so forth — require 
special care [12], They may cause statements subsequently executed to 
depend on the variables that caused them. The resulting flows will not 
be detected by the mechanism defined so far. 
The program in Figure 5 will be certified by our mechanism. A 
problem arises when sum overflows and the trap handler terminates the 
program: the value of x can be approximated by MAX/LASTi, where MAX is the 
largest value that can be stored in a register and LASTi is the last value 
of i entered into file f. The trap has effectively caused a flow of class H 
information (x) into a class L file (f). Had the programmer indicated the 
possible loop termination by replacing the wh ile express ion e with "not 
overflow sum", the invalid implicit flow from sum to f would have been 
detected [5]. 
One solution -- inhibit all traps -- can be rejected, for it defeats 
the purpose of traps. Another solution would have the compiler test, for 
each type of trap possible after each statement, the flow that would arise 
should that trap occur. This may be rejected for sheer inelegance and 
i mpract i ca1i ty. 
A practical solution is based on inhibiting all traps except those 
for which actions have been defined explicitly by the program. Such 
definitions could be made with a statement similar to one used in PL/I £17 3-
on <condition> <ident> do <stmt>, 
p: begin 
i: ? nteger secur? ty class L; 
e: Boolean secur i ty class L; 
f: file security class L; 
x, sum; integer security class H; 
begin 
sum := 0; 
i := 0; 
e := true; 
whi1e e do 
begi n 
sum := sum + x; 
i := i + 1 ; 




Figure 5- A program with invalid flow caused by a trap. 
2b 
where <condition> names a trap condition (underflow, overflow, endfile, 
etc.), <ident> is the identifier to which the condition applies, and <stmt> 
contains no gotos. All on̂  statements must appear as part of a program's 
declaration section. When the trap occurs, <stmt> is executed and control 
is returned to the point of the trap. Now: suppose there is an on statement 
"on <condi t ion> y do <stmt>j", z is a variable receiving a flow in <stmt> J P 
another statement <stmt>2 in the program contains a reference (either 
read or write) to y, and <exp> is a conditional expression in whose scope 
<stmt>2 lies. Since <stmt>1 is potentially executed immediately after the 
reference to y in <stmt>2» the implicit flow <exp> ^ ẑ  must be verified. 
To avoid having the compiler backtrack to the on^ statement to verify 
<exp> z_, it is simpler to verify a stronger condition: ^ -»• £ when the 
on statement is processed, and <exp> ^ when <stmt>2 is processed. The 
requires a modification in the semantics: the class of any <stmt> is 
defined as the greatest lower bound of all x̂  such that x ei ther receives 
a flow, is an on^ condition identifier referenced, in <stmt>. Only those 
traps for which on_ statements have been declared will be enabled by the 
compiler. 
The program in Figure 5 would be (trivially) certified by this mechanism 
since it would run with traps inhibited. Had the programmer made clear his 
intentions via the statement "or^ overflow sum do e: s fa 1se," the program 
would not be certified. 
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flpplications 
4.1 The Confinement Problem 
A service procedure Is confined as long as the system guarantees that 
It can neither retain any customer Information nor encode It into any 
value transmitted by a storage object [20, 21]. It is selectively 
confined if this restriction applies only to confidential customer information 
[5, 10]. Mechanisms enforcing varying degrees of confinement exist or have 
been proposed [2, 14, 18, 20, 26, 27]. 
Our certifier is capable of verifying the partial, or total, confine-
ment of a procedure (see Section 3-3). Let p be a procedure with input para-
meters Xj,. .. » x c»* c +|»• • • »
x
m ,
 a r |d suppose that p is permitted to retain 
information derived from the nonconfidential inputs xj,...,x , but not 
from the confidential inputs x i l (....x . The confinement of p hinges 
c+1 m 
on three properties: 1) p must be Internally secure, 2) p must not write 
Into any nonlocal object z for which •> z_ (c+l £ i <_ m), and 3) p 
must Invoke only confined procedures. By our definition of security, 
property (1) implies that confidential information cannot be encoded in 
supposedly nonconfidential results. Property (2) insures that any Informa-
tion output from p is not derived from confidential Inputs, (it does not, 
however, prevent p from returning confidential results to the customer 
through the output parameters.) Property (3) requires that p cannot be 
linked to any other procedure which might violate properties (1) or (2). 
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k.2 State Variables 
Invalid flows ("leaks") can occur in some systems when an observer 
may examine system state variables and deduce information encoded in them 
[6, 20, 26]. For example, a process could transmit a confidential value x 
by locking out files fj,...,f ; an observer could determine x by counting 
the number of locked files. These flows can be regulated by associating 
security classes with all state variables, and verifying flows to and 
from them as with any other object in the system [21]. 
M Data Bank Confidentiality 
Suppose a system (or network of systems) has a large data base con-
taining different classes of information about individuals. One class 
might be employment records, another health records, others credit records, 
tax records, criminal records, and so on. Assuming that all access to the 
data base must be performed using certified query and update procedures, 
controlling flows is straightforward. Let each user u have a clearance, 
i.e., a static security class u_. If u submits a query involving records 
Xj,...,x mof the data base, the query procedure would verify ® ... € x^ -*• 
before accepting the request. Similarly, if u submits an update request for 
records yj,...,y n, the update procedure would verify u_-y ^ 0 ... 0 ^ 
before accepting the request. 
zy 
5 Limitations 
Lampson has identified three classes of paths, or "channels", by which 
processes can transmit information out of their immediate environments [20] 
Legitimate channels are the declared, formal outputs of the process; storage 
channels are other storage objects in the nonlocal environment of the process; 
and covert channels are any other transmission methods not Involving values 
stored anywhere in the system. Since the first two channels involve informa-
tion transmitted through storage objects In the system, their flows can be 
verified by our mechanism. The third, however, employs physical phenomena 
to connect events within the computer with those outside; examples include 
program running time, power consumption, noise, and electromagnetic radiation. 
Flows along these channels are beyond the pale of our certification mechanism. 
Various run time mechanisms must be used to deal with them. Fenton [9, 10], 
and Jones and Lipton [19], have shown how to construct mechanisms that prevent 
an isolated program's running time from depending on confidential information. 
After a careful analysis, Lipner has concluded that sealing covert channels 
associated with program running time is at best difficult, and may be impossible 
in systems of shared resources [21]. 
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